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to be sold is an intoxicating beverage, the sale of which requires
a license under the law. :B'urthermore, it cannot be said that
wine for this purpose could not be conveniently obtained elsewhere.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, ,J., Traynor, J., Achauer,
,J., and Spence, J., concurred.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied May 21,
1953.

[L. A. No. 22045.

In Bank.

Apr. 29, 1953.]

TLSFJ LAHN WEITZENKORN, Appellant, v. SOL LESSEg
et al., Respondents.
[la, lb] Literary Property-Pleading.-A count of a complaint
which alleges that plaintiff wrote and was exclusive owner
of a literary composition, that she had submitted it to defendants at their special request "pursuant to an express oral
understanding and agreement" that, in consideration of such
submission, she would be paid the reasonable value thereof
and given the eustomary screen credit as author if they should
use all or any part of it, that defendants accepted submission
of the document and retained it in their possession for several months, and that thereafter they produced and exhibited
a motion picture which was patterned on, copied and used
plaintiff's composition to her damage, states a cause of action,
and a judgment of dismissal following an order sustaining
a demurrer thereto without leave to amend will be reversed
with directions to permit defendants to answer.
[2a, 2b] ld.-Pleading.-A count of a complaint which alleges that
plaintiffs furnished to defendants, at their special instance and
request, her literary composition for the purpose of sale to
defendants on payment to her of a reasonable value thereof,
and that defendants accepted such literary composition, retained and used it to her damage, states a cause of action,
and a judgment of dismissal following an order sustaining a
demurrer thereto without leave to amend will be reversed with
directions to permit defendants to answer.
[1] See Cal.Jur., Literary Property; Am.Jur., Literary Property and Copyright, § 112.
McK. Dig. Reference: [1-3] Literary Property.
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[3a-3c] Id.-Pleading.-A count of a complaint which alleges
that plaintiff submitted her literary composition to defendants with the understanding that she would be paid the reasonable value thereof if they should use all or any part of
it, and that without her knowledge, authority or consent, they
embodied her composition in a motion picture, substantially
copying and misappropriating it, does not state a cause of
action where there is no similarity as to protectible portions of
plaintiff's composition, and a judgment of dismissal following
an order sustaining a demurrer thereto without leave to amend
will be affirmed.
APPEAr~ from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Byron ,J. \:Valters, Judge pro tem.~' Affirmed in part and reversed in part with directions.

Action for damages for unlawful use of literary property.
Judgment of dismissal following order sustaining demurrers
to complaint without leave to amend affirmed as to one cause
of action and reversed as to two other causes of action with
directions to permit defendants to answer.
F'emller, ·weber & Lerner, Harold A. F'endler, Daniel A.
·weber and Robert \V. Lerner for Appellant.
Aubrey I. Finn, Pacht, Tannenbaum & Ross, Clore Warne,
Gordon Stulberg and Maxwell E. Greenberg as Amici Curiae
on behalf of Appellant.
Mitchell, Silberberg & Knupp and Arthur Groman for
Hespondents.
Thelen, Marrin, Johnson & Bridges, Loeb & Loeb, Herman
F'. Selvin and Harry L. Gershon as Amici Curiae on behalf
of Respondents.
EDMONDS, J.-Ilse Lahn Weitzenkorn has sued Sol Lesser,
Sol Lesser Productions, Inc., and HKO Radio Pictures, Inc.,
charg·ing that they have unlawfully used literary property
of which she is the owner. Her appeal is from a judgment of
dismissal which followed an order sustaining the demurrers
of the defendants without leave to amend.
[la] In the first cause of action, against Lesser and Lesser
Productions only, vVeitzenkorn alleges that she originated,
created and wrote a literary composition entitled, ''Tarzan
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.
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in the Land of Eternal Youth,'' of which she is the exclusive
owner. A copy of the composition is attached to the complaint. This composition was submitted to Lesser and the
corporation at their special request; ''pursuant to an express
oral understanding and agreement'' that, in consideration of
such submission, she would be paid the reasonable value thereof
and given the customary screen credit as author if they should
use all or any part of it. Lesser and Lesser Productions
accepted submission of the document, she states, retained it
in their possession for several months, and ''became fully
familiar with the contents.''
Thereafter according to the complaint, Lesser and Lesser
Productions produced a motion picture, entitled "Tarzan's
Magic Fountain,'' which they distributed and exhibited in
conjunction with RKO Pictures. This motion picture, W eitzenkorn alleges, "is patterned upon and copies and uses" her
composition. By reason of its nature and bulk, and because
it is in the possession of the defendants, a copy of the motion
picture film is not attached to the complaint. Damages of
$50,000 are claimed as the reasonable value of her composition,
and the same amount for the reasonable value of the screen
credit which she did not receive.
[2a] The second count, also against Lesser and Lesser Productions only, incorporates by reference all of the allegations of
the first except the averments with respect to an express agreement. In addition, it alleges that vVeitzenkorn submitted the
composition to Lesser and Lesser Productions at their request
for the purpose of sale to, or use by, them, upon payment to
her of its reasonable value.
[3a] The third count, against all of the defendants, incorporates by reference the material allegations of the first, with
the exception of those relating to an express agreement and
damages. W eitzenkorn then alleges that, without her knowledge, authority or consent, the defendants produced and distributed ''Tarzan's Magic Fountain,'' substantially copying
and misappropriating her composition. General damages of
$100,000 are alleged to have been sustained.
Lesser and Lesser Productions demurred to the complaint
upon the grounds that each count fails to state facts sufficient
to constitute a cause of action and that, in certain particulars,
each of them is ambiguous, unintellig·ible or uncertain. RKO
demurred to the third count upon the same grounds. At the
request of the defendants, pursuant to section 426 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, the court made an order for a viewing
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of the motion picture prior to and in connection with its ruling
on the demurrers. The order also directed "that the contents
of such production be deemed a part of the complaint to the
same extent and with the same foree as though such production
had been attached to the complaint."
'l'he composition or synopsis which is the basis of the controversy may be summarized as follows:
Tarzan, Jane, Boy and Cheta are interrupted by the arrival
of an airplane "breaking the peace of their jungle idyl." The
visitors are Jane's British cousin, Peter Selton, and his manservant, Gus. Peter is an "aging dandy." Gus provides
comic relief, aided and abetted by the monkey, Cheta. Tarzan
is not too happy to have guests; the travelers appear to be
prepared for an indefinite stay.
Peter is "rather cagey about the reason" for his visit and
Tarzan ''senses there is more to Peter's expedition'' than
Peter is willing to reveal. Peter flies about the countryside
seeking, and eventually finding, the Fountain of Youth located
in the "Land Between Dusk and Sunrise," of which he has
a map. Boy, without Tarzan's permission, accompanies Peter
and Gus on the day they fly to the mysterious land. The
three are captured by warriors of the beautiful but cruel
Queen Lilith who rules the land of eternal youth. Queen
Lilith offers them the choice of eternal youth or death. No
one can leave her land.
Tarzan, meanwhile, worried by the absence of Boy, sets
off with Jane and Cheta to rescue him. Tarzan and Jane
themselves are captured by Lilith's warriors. Tarzan escapes
with Jane and Boy and, after getting them to safety, attempts
to free Peter and Gus. In the ensuing battle, Peter dies a
hero. Tarzan destroys the land and its inhabitants by throwing a flame into the fountain of youth. The queen and her
subjects wither into extreme old age, shrink, disintegrate and
vanish.
The motion picture has been viewed by the Justices of this
court. It also features Tarzan, Jane and Cheta, but has no
character corresponding to Boy. Tarzan freely enters and
leaves Blue Valley, the land of eternal youth. The kindly
king of the land is his friend. Tarzan's first visit is upon a
mission of mercy. He is seeking Gloria James, an aviatrix
missing for 20 years, whose testimony is needed to free a man
from prison. Gloria leaves the valley with Tarzan, goes to
England and marries. Having aged rapidly after leaving the
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Yalley, she comes back to Africa with her husband to seek
Tarzan's help in returning to the land of eternal youth.
Tarzan refuses Gloria's request, but in his absence Jane
offers to lead them to Blue Valley. Tarzan follows the party
to teach Jane a lesson, rescues them from a flood, and secretly
conveys Gloria and her husband to the land of eternal youth,
leaving Jane to return home. The king of the valley permits
Tarzan to leave in friendship, but rebel warriors capture and
attempt to blind him.
Tarzan escapes to discover Jane in peril. Dodd and Trask,
the villains of the picture who are seeking the land of eternal
youth for profit, have forced Jane to show them the way.
Tarzan rescues J·ane. Dodd and Trask die at the hands of
valley g·uards.
\Veitzenkorn contends that her complaint tenders issues of
fact with respect to originality, similarity and copying which
require a trial on the merits. These issues, she says, should not
have been determined on demurrer as questions of law. In
addition, she argues that the first and second counts, based
upon express and implied contracts, tender issues of fact as
to whether Lesser and Lesser Productions promised to pay
for the use of her compositiou regardless of whether it was
original.
It is also argued that section 426 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, as amended in 1947, does not authorize the determination upon demurrer of factual issues such as originality,
similarity, aecess and copying. The section is said to apply
only to ''infringement'' eases, not to those concerning breach
of express or implied contract.
The defendants take the position that section 426 was
amended to create a statutory method for determining upon
demurrer whether a complaint for plagiarism and related
contract theories states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action. Originality and similarity, they say, are questions of
law to be determined by the court in the first instance. Upon
the issue of originality, they contend, the court should apply
the doctrine of judicial notice.
Section 426 ( 3), Code of Civil Procedure, as amended in
1947, in part provides: "If the demand be for relief on account of the alleged infringement of the plaintiff's rights in
and to a literary, artistic or intellectual production, there must
be attached to the complaint a copy of the production as to
which the infringement is claimed and a copy of the alleged
infringing produetion. If, by reason of bulk or the nature
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of the production, it is not practicable to attach a copy to the
complaint, that fact and the reasons why it is impracticable
to attach a copy of the production to the complaint shall be
alleged; and the court, in connection with any demurrer,
motion or other proceeding in the cause in which a knowledge
of the contents of such production may be necessary or desirable, shall make such order for a view of the production not
attached as will suit the convenience of the court, to the end
that the contents of such production may be deemed to be a
part of the complaint to the same extent and with the same
force as though such production had been capable of being
and had been attached to the complaint.''
The effective date of the statute was subsequent to the filing
of the complaints in Stanley v. Col7tmbia Broadcasting System,
Inc., 35 Ca1.2d 653 [221 P.2d 73, 23 A.L.R.2d 2161, and
Gold7:ng v. R.K.O. P1:ctures, Inc., 35 Cal.2d 690 [221 P.2d 95].
The question as to the effect of the enactment here arises for
the first time.
\Veitzenkorn asserts that the code section is not applicable
to her first and second causes of action. As she construes the
statute, it is limited to the tort action for "infringement."
The defendants claim its benefits as to both the tort action
and related contract actions.
The statute is similar to rule 2 of the Supreme Court Rules
for Practice and Procedure under section 101 of the Copyright Act. (17 U.S.C.A., following § 101, formerly § 25.)
That rule provides in part: ''A copy of the alleged infringement of copyright, if actually made, and a copy of the work
alleged to be infringed, should accompany the petition, or its
absence be explained; . . . '' Form 17 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure also provides for attachment of infringed
and infringing compositions to a complaint for infringement
of copyright. (Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., form 17, 28 U.S.C.A.)
The federal courts consistently have held that failure to
attach copies of the infringed and infringing compositions, or
to explain such failure, renders a complaint for infringement
of copyright defective. (Buck v. L1:ederkranz, 34 F.Supp.
1006, 1007; Cole v. Allen, 3 F.R.D. 236, 237.) However, rule
2 makes no provision for the court to order a view of the production if physical attachment is not feasible. There is also
an essential difference in language between rule 2 and our
statute. Rule 2 is limited to ''infringement of copyright'';
section 426 (3) extends to "infringement of . . . rights in and
to a literary, artistic or intellectual production.'' Thus, rule
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2 clearly applies only to a cause of action for infringement
of copyright, and its provisions are not applicable to a cause
of action based upon breach of contract or quasi contract.
W eitzenkorn argues that, without exception, the word "infringement'' has been defined by the state and federal courts
as referring to a tort. The statute, she says, cannot be construed as applying ''infringement'' to an action for breach
of express or implied contract or for quasi contract. She relies upon the rule that: ''When the scope and meaning of words
or phrases in a statute have been repeatedly interpreted by
the courts, there is some indication that the use of them in
a subsequent statute in a similar setting carries with it a
like construction." (Perry v. Jordan, 34 Cal.2d 87, 93 [207
P.2d 47] ; City of Long Beach v. Payne, 3 Cal.2d 184, 191
[44 P.2d 305].)
However, the courts have not defined the word "infringement," standing by itself, as referring only to a tort. Rather,
the definition consistently has been that the phrase "infringement of copyright" connotes a tort. (Frankel v. Irwin, 34
F.2d 142, 143; McCaleb v. Fox Film Corp., 299 F. 48, 50.)
In like manner, an action to recover damages arising out of
alleged plagiarism has been classified as a tort action (ltaliani
v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Corp., 45 Cal.App.2d 464, 466-467
[114 P.2d 370]) and the defendant in such an action referred
to as a tort feasor. (Barsha. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 32 Cal.
App.2d 556, 559 [90 P.2d 371] .)
Although the word "infringement" is most commonly applied to actions for unlawful appropriation of copyright,
trademark, or patent (see, generally, 21 W. & Ph. 315 et seq.,
''Infringe ; Infringement''), its usage is not limited solely to
such actions. Black's Law Dictionary, 4th edition, page 920,
defines ''infringement'' as : ''A breaking into ; a trespass or
encroachment upon; a violation of a law, regulation, contract,
or right. Used especially of invasions of the rights secured
by patents, copyrights, and trademarks.'' This definition of
infringement as applying to both tortious and contractual
wrongs is in accord with the definitions in Webster's New International Dictionary, second edition. "Infringe" is there defined: "To commit a breach of; to violate; to neglect to fulfill or obey; to commit an infringement of; as, to infringe a
law, contract, or patent." Webster's definition of "infringement" is: "1. Act of infringing; esp., breach; violation; nonfulfillment; as, the infringement of a treaty, compact, law or
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constitution. 2. An encroachment or trespass on a right or
privilege; a trespass; . . . "
It is clear, therefore, that the word ''infringement'' has no
technical meaning when disassociated from the phrase "infringement of copyright (patent, trademark)." Thus, an
action based upon infringement, or breach, of contract would
fall within the terms of a statute relating to infringement of
rights which may be contractual. Only where the statute refers to a term of art such as "infringement of copyright"
would the action for breach of contract be excluded from its
operation.
The Legislature has not limited section 426(3) to "infringement of copyright'' alone, but has included within its operation infringement of any ''rights in and to a literary, artistic
or intellectual production.'' These rights may be entirely contractual, as in Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc ...
supra, where there was no copyright. Construed in accordance with these definitions, the statute applies not only to the
third alleged cause of action for infringement of copyright, but
also to the first and second causes of action for infringement of
related contract rights. Accordingly, the order of the superior
court making the motion picture a part of the complaint affects all three alleged causes of action.
Concerning the scope of the code section, W eitzenkorn contends that all of the issues presented are questions of fact
which cannot be decided upon demurrer. She argues that the
statute cannot deprive her of her right to a trial by jury. The
only purpose of the statute, she says, is to proteet the defendant in such an action from an attempt to prove a fraudulent claim by presenting upon the trial a production created
after the action was commenced.
The statute is neither so limited as she contends, nor so
broad as to destroy the right to a jury trial. The Legislature
has required that the allegeil infringed and infringing productions be marlr a pRrt of the complaint. If this he impracticable,
hy a different procedure they are a part of the pleading to
the same extent as if they had been attached to it.
W eitzenkorn correctly argues that the well pleaded facts
of her complaint must be taken as true for the purposes of
demurrer. However, the facts pleaded include the productions incorporated in accordance with the statute. ''The general rule is that when a written instrument which is the foundation of a cause of action or defense is attached to a pleading
as an exhibit and incorporated into it by proper reference,
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the court may, upon demurrer, examine the exhibit and treat
the pleader's allegations of its legal effect as surplusage.''
(Washer v. Bank of America, 21 Cal.2d 822, 829-830
[136 P.2d 297, 155 A.L.R. 1338] ; Gosewisch v. Doran, 161
Cal. 511, 515-516 [119 P. 656, Ann.Cas. 1913D 442]; Ventura
etc. Ry. Co. v. Hartman, 116 Cal. 260,263 [48 P. 65].) The
same rule is as applicable to an action for the taking of literary
property as to other types of actions to which it has been applied. (Shipman v. R.ILO. Radio Pictures, Inc., 20 F.Supp.
249, affd. 100 F.2d 533; Lowenfels v. Nathan, 2 F.Supp. 73,
74.)
The vital question, therefore, is: What matters properly
are brought within the scope of the inquiry by these demurrers? W eitzenkorn argues that the issues concerning
originality, similarity and copying are questions of fact which
cannot be determined upon demurrer. The defendants contend that these are questions of law to be determined by the
court in the first instance. The issue of access is not here involved because the allegation thereof in the complaint must
be taken as true for the purpose of ruling upon the demurrers.
Although the precise question here is of first impression
in this state, it has been foreshadowed by the Stanley and
Golding cases, supra. As stated in the Golding case, ''It is,
however, only the product of the writer's creative mind which
is protectible. . . . The plaintiff must establish, as the subject of the cause of action, a right in the nature of property
which is capable of ownership. . . . It is essential from the
nature of the inquiry as to originality to first dissect the play
to determine wherein, if at all, plaintiffs have any protectible
property right. Assuming this is established, then comparison
may be made between the two works as to the original and protectible portion only." (Sttpra, pp. 695, 700.)
W eitzenkorn would limit the holding of the Golding case
to the single proposition that only the "question as to whether
the claimed original or novel idea has been reduced to concrete form is an issue of law." (P. 695.) She construes the
decision as holding that the issues of originality, similarity,
and copying are questions of fact only for the jury. However,
from a reading of Golding's play, the court determined that
there was sufficient evidence of originality to sustain the
implied finding of the jury. Accordingly, if the production
attached to \Veitzenkorn 's complaint shows no evidence of
originality, she has no protectible property therein and there
is no question to submit to the jury.
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The Stanley case, supra, page 665, and Yadkoe v. Fields,
66 Cal..App.2d 150, 159 ll51 P.2d 906], state that the origim<Iity of the plaintiff's program is not a question of law to
be determined by the court but is one of fact for the jury.
Implicit in both opinions, however, is the acknowledgment
that, in the first instance, the question of originality or novelty
is one of law. After determining the issue of similarity in the
Stanley case, the court stated: ''The next question to be discussed is whether or not plaintiff's idea as such was so new
and novel as to be worthy of protection." (P. 663.) Obviously,
without proof of originality, the judgment would not have been
affirmerl. I .. ikewise in Y adkoe v. Fields, the court held that:
"Sufficient evidence was presented on behalf of respondent
for consideration by the jury of the issues raised by the pleadings; . . . '' (Supra, p. 161.)
The next question is what method the court may use to determine the issue of originality presented by the demurrers.
'l'he defendants urge that the court may take judicial notice
of the contents of published books in deciding whether
vVeitzenkorn 's claim of originality has merit.
This would carry the doctrine of judicial notice far beyond its proper bounds. (Dezendorf v. Twentieth CenturyFox Ihlrn C Mp., 99 F .2d 850, 851.) "The doctrine of judicial
notice was adopted as a judicial short-cut to avoid necessity
for the formal introduction of evidence in certain cases where
there is no real need for such evidence. Before a court will
take judicial notice of any fact, however, that fact must be a
matter of common and general knowledge, well established and
authoritatively settled, not doubtful or uncertain. The test
is whether sufficient notoriety attaches to the fact to make it
proper to assume its existence without proof.'' (Communist
Party v. Peek, 20 Cal.2d 536, 546 [127 P.2d 889] .) "It is
truly said that the power of judicial notice is as to matters
claimed to be matters of general knowledge one to be used
with caution. If there is any doubt whatever either as to the
fact itself or as to its being a matter of common knowledge,
evidence should be required." (Varcoe v. Lee, 180 Cal. 338,
345 [181 P. 223].)
The court may take judicial notice of the fact that there
exist in the realm of fiction certain well-known characters
called Tarzan, Jane and Cheta who live in Africa, and that
the myth of a fountain of eternal youth is one of the oldest
known to man. These are facts of common and general knowledge. However, common and general knowledge may not
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be said to include the fact that, in previously published works,
these characterf' and myth have been combined with the same
treatme'nt and manner of expression which W eitzenkorn has
used. Nor by judicial notice may a court find that Weitzenkorn 's composition has been copied, as to plot or details, from
previously published books. These are matters which are
properly the subject of proof.
Even though, by applying the rule of judicial notice, the
basic characters and locale of Weitzenkorn 's composition
might be held to be unoriginal, the combination of these
characters and locale with other characters in a certain style
and manner of expression cannot be held, upon demurrer, to
lack originality as a matter of law. For these reasons, insofar
as the question of a lack of originality may be involved in each
eause of action, the demurrers could not have been sustained
solely upon that ground.
Section 980 of the Civil Code was amended materially in
1947. .At the time the Stanley and Golding cases were commenced, it stated the following rule : ''The author of any
product of the mind, whether it is an invention or a composition in letters or art, or a design, with or without delineation,
or other graphical representation, has an exclusive ownership
therein, and in the representation or expression thereof, which
continues so long as the product and the representations or
expressions thereof made by him remain in his possession.'' .As
amended, the section read: ''The author or proprietor of any
composition in letters or art has an exclusive ownership in
the representation or expression thereof as against all persons
except one who originally and independently creates the same
or a similar composition.'' Insofar as is material to this action,
the section is now in the same form.
In the Stanley and Golding cases, protection was extended
to an ''idea'' rather than to the form and manner of its expre:Ssion. The judgment in favor of Stanley was affirmed upon
the ground that his idea was the new and novel combination
of elements for a radio program. (P. 664.) In the Golding
case the court, relying upon the former wording of section
980, held that the ''product of the writer's creative mind''
(p. 695) is protectible and it extended that protection to his
idea, "the basic dramatic core" (p. 697) of his play. Such
extension of protection to an idea transcends the normal
bounds of common law copyright (Moore v. Ford Motor Co.,
28 F.2d 529, 536, aff'd. 43 F.2d 685; .Amdur, Copyright Law
and Practice 50, § 11; note, 23 .A.L.R.2d 244, 249) in which
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ideas'' are free as air.'' (Fe,;aler v. MoroMo, 253 N.Y. 281, 287
[171 N..E. 56].) However,. in its earlier form, the statute expressly protected both the idea, the "product of the mind,"
and "the representation or expression thereof!'
The 1947 amendment to section 980 has eliminated .the
protection· formerly given to··'fany .Product of the mind.''
The statute as it now exists, and as it read at the time this
cause of action arose, provides protection only "in the
representation or expression" of a composition. The L{lgisIature has abrogated the rule of protectibility of an idea and
California now accepts the traditional theory of. protectible
property under common law copyright. (38 .CalL.Rev. 3'37;
note, 23 AL.R.2d 244, 262, n.l.)
No problem is presented in. tliis case as to whether Weitzenkorn 's idea. has. been reduced to concrete form, the composition for which she claims protection being attached to ·the
complaint. Therefore; the question whether she has a protectible property interest depends upon the originality of
form and manner of expression, the development of characterizations and sequence of events: (Universal Pictures Oo. 'V.
Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 Ji'.2d 354, 363; Harold Lloyd Corp.,
v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1, 24-27; Stephens v. Howells Sales Oo.,
16 F.2d 805, 808.) The idea alone, the bare, unde'Veloped story
situation or theme, is not protectible. (Shipman v~ R;K.O.
Radio Pic:t~!res, Inc., 100 F.2d 533, 536~537; Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F .2d 119, 122, eert. denied, . 282
U.S. 902 [51 S.Ct. 216, 75 L.Ed. 795]; Dymow 'V. Bolton,
11 F.2d 690, 691.) Here, to use the form of analysis employed
in the Golding case, Weitzenkorn's idea, or ~'basic· dramatic
core" (p. 694), is to combine certain characters in ~African
locale .with the. myth of a fountain of eternal youth ·and,
through the advf;lntures which befall them, .to teach a mo:ral.
'~he moral a:ppears to be that .eternal youth is not .a blessing
being one full of lov;e
lint a curse, the only satisfactory
and affection: However, the ''representation or expression"
now protected by the statute. is not. this basic dramatic core,
but is. :rather
developme:q.t of both characterizations and
adventures.
. The next point requiring consideration concerns similarity.
.Access being admitted by the demurrer, if. some subst~tial
similarity between the compositions reasonably could be found,
the .issues of similarity and qf c0pyin~ .are to be deter:rp.incd
by the· trier of fact.
·

790

WEITZENKORN' V. LESSER

[40 C.2d

In the Golding case it was said that whether the ''evidence
is sufficient to sustain the jury's implied finding of similarity
is a question which can only be determined upon appeal by
reading the play and seeing the moving picture, which have
been done by this court.
''The parties are directly at variance as to whether this
issue of similarity presents a question of law or of fact. The
only direct statements in the cases appear to confirm the
playwrights' position that it is a question of fact for the
jury. (Citations.) However, they extend this point too far
when they contend that the determination by the jury of this
issue 'is conclusive' upon appeal. No finding of fact is binding
upon an appellate court if it is not supported by substantial
evidence. The function of this court, when the contention
of insufficiency is made, is to examine the record to ascertain
whether there is evidence to support the verdict of the jury.
''. . . It is necessary to read or view the two works to
see if they present any substantial similarity insofar as the
plaintiff's property in his work is concerned. This is not to
say that the appellate court will substitute itself for the jury
to decide what it thinks of the issue of similarity; it is merely
a question of determining if there is any substantial evidence
of similarity to support the jury's finding." (Pp. 698-699.)
Unquestionably, an appellate court may determine, as a
matter of law, that the evidence is insufficient to support the
judgment. As a corollary of this fundamental principle,
whether there is any question to present to the trier of fact
is, in the first instance, a question of law. And the two
productions, the only evidence of similarity which could possibly be offered, are before the court upon the demurrer in
accordance with the statute.
The Stanley case recognizes the rule as to similarity applied
in the Golding case. The court there held: ''With respect
to the comparison between the two programs and without
unnecessarily 'dissecting' them, there appears to be sufficient
simi] arity to justify the finding of the jury as the 'average,
reasonable man.' . . . We then have a question of factthat of the similarity between the two programs. This question of fact was decided adversely to defendant by the jury
whose duty it was to make the determination. The rule is
settled that this determination will not be interfered with
upon appeal where there is evidence to sustain it. The evidence, in the form of the two programs alone, shows that there
is substantial similarity to support the verdict." (Pp. 662-
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663.) If no similarity had appeared between the two productions, as a matter of law, the judgment entered upon the
verdict of the jury would have been reversed.
Having both productions before it in accordance with
section 426 ( 3), the court may determine whether there is
substantial similarity between them. If, as a matter of law,
there is no such similarity, no question of fact is in issue
and the demurrers to each count of the complaint were
properly sustained. But if, from a comparison of the two
productions, such similarity reasonably might be found, that
issue, and also the question as to copying, should have been
submitted to the jury for determination.
[3b] In order for the third count of the complaint to state a
cause of action for plagiarism, there must be some substantial
similarity between the motion picture and protectible portions
of Weitzenkorn's composition. (Golding v. R.K.O. Pictures,
Inc., supra, pp. 699, 700; Shipman v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures,
snpra, 100 F.2d 533, 537-538; De Montijo v. 20th Century
Fox: F'ilnt Corp., 40 F. Supp. 133, 138-139; Echevarria v.
WarneT BTos. PicttM·es, 12 F. Supp. 632, 638.) A careful
comparison of vVeitzenkorn 's composition and the motion
picture sho\YS no similarity between them as to form and manner of expression. It is true that a portion of the "basic
dramatic core'' might be found similar. Both productions combine the characters of Tarzan, Jane and Cheta in an African
locale with the myth of a fountain of eternal youth. However, even here there is an essential difference. The combination of characters, locale and myth is not utilized for
the same purposes. If the motion picture has a moral, it is
that eternal youth is the reward for the good, which must be
saved from the grasp of evil forces which would corrupt it.
In achieving their divergent goals from certain similar combinations of basic ingredients, the two stories are developed
along widely different lines. This is true of characterizations,
descriptions, and events. Because there is no similarity as to
protectible portions of W eitzenkorn 's composition, the demurrer to the third count of the complaint properly was
sustained.
The question of protectibility need not be considered in
determining the sufficiency of the allegations of the first count
of the complaint, based upon express contract. As it is pleaded,
the proof could show that Lesser and Lesser Productions agreed
to pay for W eitzenkorn 's composition if they used it, or any
portion of it, regardless of its originality. An "idea, if valu-
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able, may be the subject of contract. While the idea disclosed
may be common or even open to public knowledge, yet such
disclosure if protected by contract, is sufficient consideration
for the promise to pay." (High v. Trade Union Courier Pub.
Corp., 69 N.Y.S.2d 526, 529, affd. 89 N.Y.S.2d 527; Cole v.
Lord, Inc., 262 App.Div. 116, 121 [28 N.Y.S.2d 404] ; Schonwald v. F. Burkart Mfg. Co., 356 Mo. 435, 448 [202 S.W.2d
7]; Brunner v. Stix, Baer· & Fttller Co., 352 Mo. 1225, 1232
[181 S.W.2d 643].)
The charge of breach of contract, however, is dependent
upon the allegation that the motion picture "is patterned upon
and copies and uses" Weitzenkorn's composition. If, as. a
matter of law, there is no similiarity whatsoever between the
productions, the first count does not state a cause of action.
However, although there is no similarity between protectible
portions of Weitzenkorn's composition and the defendants'
production, similarity may exist because of the combination
of characters, locale, and myth. It is conceivable, even though
improbable, that W eitzenkorn might be able to introduce evidence tending to show that the parties entered into an express
contract whereby Lesser and Lesser Productions agreed to
pay for her production regardless of its protectibility and no
matter how slight or commonplace the portion which they
used. Such evidence, together with comparison of the productions, would present questions of fact for the jury as to
the terms of the contract, access, similarity, and copying.
[lb] Under these circumstances, the facts pleaded in the first
count are sufficient to state a cause of action and the demurrer
to it was improperly sustained.
[2b] The second count of the complaint alleges that Weitzenkorn submitted her composition to Lesser and Lesser Productions ''at their special instance and request . . . for the
purpose of sale to or use by defendants upon payment to plaintiff of the reasonable value thereof and said defendants . . .
thereupon accepted submission of said literary and dramatic
composition by plaintiff and retained the same and became
fully familiar with the contents thereof." Incorporated by
reference from the first count are the allegations of originality,
copying, the reasonable value of the production, and the defendants' refusal to pay. This is, in essence, the common
count of quantum valebant for the reasonable value of goods
sold and delivered.
''This form of pleading, a common count, by long continued
practice is not subject to attack by general demurrer or by
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a special demurrer for uncertainty." (Auckland v. Conlin,
203 Cal. 776, 778 [265 P. 946] ; Pike v. Zadig, 171 Cal. 273,
276 [152 P. 923]; Abadie v. Carrillo, 32 Cal. 172, 175.) Nor
is it subject to special demurrer on the ground of ambiguity
or unintelligibility. (Pleasant v. Samuels, 114 Cal. 34, 38
[45 P. 998]; see, generally, King, The Use of the Common
Counts in California, 14 So.Cal.L.Rev. 288, 306.) Although
an allegation of the promise to pay was essential to an action
of assumpsit in common law pleading (Shipman, Common-Law
Pleading, 3d ed., p. 258) it is unnecessary as a part of the
common count under the code system of pleading. (Gregory
v. Olabrough's Executors, 129 Cal. 475, 478 [62 P. 72]; Wilkins v. Stidger, 22 Cal. 231, 235 [83 Am.Dec. 64] .)
The defendants contend that, where a demurrer is sustained
as to a count specifically pleaded, it should also be sustained
as to the common count based upon the same facts. Although
it is proper under such circumstances to sustain a general
demurrer to the entire complaint (Hays v. Temple, 23 Cal.
App.2cl 690, 695 [73 P.2d 1248] ; Harris v. Kessler, 124 Cal.
App. 299, 303 [12 P.2d 467]), the rule is not here applicable.
The :first count is sufficient to state a cause of action and the
facts relied upon in the second count are identical, with the
exception that no express promise to pay is alleged. That the
facts may also be substantially similar to those in the third
count, which does not state a cause of action, will not defeat
the common count unless it clearly appears to be based upon
the insufficient, rather than the sufficient, specific allegations.
Under the code system of pleading, as at common law, the
common counts are sufficient to state a cause of action upon
either a contract implied in fact (McClure v. Alberti, 190 Cal.
348, 351 [212 P. 204]; Castagnino v. Balletta, 82 Cal. 250,
257-259 [23 P. 127]) or a contract implied in law. (Stein.er
v. Rowley, 35 Cal.2d 713, 717-718 f221 P.2d 9]; M1:n01· v.
Baldridge, 123 Cal. 187, 190 f55 P. 783].) "It is not neceR:;;ary for the pleader to indicate what kind of 'implied' contract, whether in fact or in law, he relies upon." (Shipman,
Common-Law Pleading, 3d ed., p. 154.) However, the common count will not lie where the obligation of the defendant
is something other than the payment of money. (Willett &
Burr v. Alpert, 181 Cal. 652, 658-662 [185 P. 976]; O'Connor
v. Dingley, 26 Cal. 11, 22-23.) Therefore, although no objection to the claim for damages· for failure to give screen credit
was raised as a ground for demurrer to the second count, it
should be noted that recovery, if any, upon the qu,antum
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valebant count must be limited solely to the reasonable value
of the composition, or portion of it, which was used.
It is unnecessary for the pleading to distinguish between
the contract implied in fact and the contract implied in law,
or quasi contract, but the elements which must be proved
for recovery upon each of them are quite different. The only
distinction between an implied-in-fact contract and an express
contract is that, in the former, the promise is not expressed
in words but is implied from the promisor's conduct. (Silva
v. Providence Hospital of Oakland, 14 Cal.2d 762, 773 [97
P.2d 798] ; Smith v. Moynihan, 44 Cal. 53, 62; Grant v. Long,
33 Cal.App.2d 725, 736-737 [92 P.2d 940] ; Civ. Code, §§ 16191621.) Under the theory of a contract implied in fact, the
required proof is essentially the same as under the first count
upon express contract, with the exception that conduct from
which the promise may be implied must be proved. (Cole
v. Lord, Inc., supra.) Therefore, for the reasons stated in
discussing the sufficiency of the allegations of the first count
of the complaint, the demurrer to the second count should
not have been sustained.
This conclusion does not mean, however, that, upon trial,
W eitzenkorn may be able to recover upon either the theory
of a contract implied in fact or that of one implied in law.
The so-called "contract implied in law" in reality is not a
contract. (Philpott v. S1tperior Court, 1 Cal.2d 512, 520 [36
P.2d 635, 95 A.L.R. 990]; HaU1:die v. Enginger, 175 Cal. 505,
508 [166 P. 1].) "Quasi-contracts, unlike true contracts, are
not based on the apparent intention of the parties to undertake the performances in question, nor are they promises. They
are obligations created by law for reasons of justice." (Rest.,
Contracts, § 5, com. a.) Quasi-contractual recovery is based
upon benefit accepted or derived for which the law implies
an obligation to pay. "Where no benefit is accepted or derived there is nothing from which such contract can be implied." (Rowell v. Crow, 93 Cal.App.2d 500, 503 [209 P.2d
149].)
The existence of a contract implied in law under a quantum
valebant count depends upon whether the defendant "has used
for its benefit any property of [plaintiff] . . . in such manner and under such circumstances that the law will impose a
duty of compensation therefor." (Thomas v. R. J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 350 Pa. 262, 266 [38 A.2d 61]; Bowen v. Yankee
Network, 46 F.Supp. 62, 63; Bailey v. Haberle Congress Brewing Co., 193 Misc. 723, 724-725 [85 N.Y.S.2d 51] ; Alberts
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v. Rem1:ngton Rand, Inc., 175 Misc. 486, 487 [23 N.Y.S.2d 892] ;
Bristol v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 132 N.Y. 264, 267 [30
N.E. 506, 28 Am.St.Rep. 568] .) The material which is used
must constitute protectible property if recovery is to be had
upon quasi contract (Booth Y. Stutz i1lotor· Car Co. of America, 56 F.2d 962, 969; Plus Promotions, Inc. v. RCA Mfg.
Co., Inc., 49 F.Supp. 116.) Therefore, the proof necessary
to recover upon the theory of a contract implied in law is the
same as that required by the tort action for plagiarism. There
is no similarity between these productions as to form and
manner of expression, the portion which may be protectible
property. Thus, because the defendants have used no property belonging to W eitzenkorn, she cannot recover upon a
quasi-contractual theory. Had that been the only cause of
action stated by the allegations of the second count, the demurrer thereto properly would have been sustained. It is
only because the common count includes also facts eharging
an implied-in-fact contract that the demurrer should have
been overruled.
[3c] \V eitzenkorn complains that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to sustain the demurrers without leave
to amend. The conclusions whic~h haye been reached make
it necessary to consider this contention only as to the third
count of the complaint. The only evidence of similarity between
the productions which can be presented is the productions
themselves. Because there is no similarity between them as to
protectible portions of \Veitzenkorn 's composition, no cause
of action for plagiarism is or can be stated. Under such
circumstances, there was no abuse of discretion in sustaining
the demurrer to the third count without leave to amend.
(Routh Y. Quinn, 20 Cal.2d 488, 493 [127 P.2d 1, 149, A.L.R.
215] .)
The judgment is affirmed as to the third cause of action and
reversed as to the first and second causes of action with directions to permit the defendants to answer.
Gibson, C. J., and Shenk, J., concurred.
Traynor, ,J., and Spence, J., concurred in the judgment.
SCHAUER, J., Concurring.-For the reasons stated in my
concurring opinion in B~lrtis v. Universal Pictures Co., Inc.,
post, p. 823 [256 P.2d 933] I concur in the judgment
herein and also in those portions of Justice Edmonds' opinion
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whid1 a,r·f~ not irwonsistent with the Yiews I have pa.rticnla.rl;\
indicated.

CAR'l'EH, J .-I dissent.
I disagree with the interpretation placed by the majority
on the 1947 amendment to section 980 of the Civil Code.
1'hat section as it formerly read provided that '''I' he author
of any product of the mind, whether it is an invention, or
a composition in letters or art, or a desig·n, with or without
delineation, or other graphical representation, has an exclusive ownership therein, and in the representation or expression thereof, which continues so long as the product and
the representations or expressions thereof made by him remain in his possession.'' As amended, it read (at the time
of this action) that "The author or proprietor of any composition in letters or art has an exclusive ownership in the
representation or expression thereof as against all persons
except one who originally and independently creates the same
or a similar composition." 'l'he majority holds that the 1947
amendment has ''eliminated the protection formerly given to
'any product of the mind.' The statute as it now exists,
and as it read at the time this cause of action arose, provides
protection only 'in the representation or expression' of a composition. The Legislature has abrogated the rule of protectibility of an idea and California now accepts the traditional
theory of protectible property under common law copyright.''
It is held that the basic dramatic core is no longer protected
but only the "representation or expression"-the development of both characterizations and adventures. This is the
method by which the majority has determined that the question of originality shall be decided. It is admitted that a "portion of the 'basic dramatic core' might be found similar" in
comparing W eitzenkorn 's composition and the motion picture
in the instant case, but because of changes in the characterizations, descriptions and events,-what the majority calls the
protectible interests involved-the demurrer to the third count
(plagiarism) of the complaint was held properly sustained.
It has been stated that the policy of the law is to promote
the progress of literature by protecting the author against
the plagiarist (38 C.L.R. 332), but by minor changes in the
sequence of events and the characterizations, the plagiarist
may escape liability under this holding that only the representation or expression of an idea or plot is protected. This
unnecessarily harsh result will not have the effect of promot-
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ing the progress of literature. Authors, anxious to find a market for their work, are not in an advantageous bargaining position to insist that the one to whom the composition is submitted sign a contract agreeing to compensate them if the
work is used. It can be admitted that the characters Tarzan,
Jane and Cheta are well-known, old and in the public domain
as is the myth of the Fountain of Youth. A combination of
those characters and the myth of the Fountain of Youthor the basic, central plot-could very easily be considered
original, but this court denies protection now to the plot,
or central idea, and says that only the expression of the
characterizations, events and descriptions is to be protected
under the 1947 amendment to section 980 of the Civil Code.
'fhe movie industry is constantly looking for ''ideas'' and
''plots'' which it develops as it sees fit. That plots are protectible, see Shipman v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 100 F.2d
533, 536-537; Dam v. Kirke LaSheUe, 175 F. 902, 907, 908 [99
C.C.A. 392, 20 Ann.Cas. 1173, 41 L.R.A.N.S. 1002]; Nichols
v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121. Even when
a book is purchased by the industry and made into a motion
picture, the motion picture may differ so radically from the
book because of the change in events, characterizations, locale,
and conclusion that one who has read the book has difficulty
in recognizing any similarity between it and the picture. To
extend protection only to the expression and representation
is to give no protection at all.
It is admitted in the majority opinion that an idea may
be protected by an express contract, but any recovery for
breach of that contract depends upon similarity between the
two productions. In its statement with respect to the first
count, based upon express contract, this court practically
directs the trial court to direct the jury to find that Lesser
did not promise to pay for W eitzenkorn 's production: ''It is
1:onceivable, even thmtgh in'"probable, that W eitzenkorn might
be able to introduce evidence tending to show that the parties
entered into an express contract whereby Lesser and Lesser
Productions agreed to pay for her production regardless of
its protectibility (which is unimportant so far as this court
is concerned) and no matter how slight or commonplace the
portion which they used. Such evidence, together with comparison of the productions, would present questions of fact
for the jury as to the terms of the contract, access, similarity,
and copying. Under these circumstances, the facts pleaded
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in the first count are sufficient to state a cause of action and
the demurrer to it was improperly sustained." (Emphasis
added.)
No concise test has ever been laid down for determining
the question of originality. It has been said that one requisite
is that the work be original in the sense of being the creative
product of the author's own effort. There is no requirement
that the work be original in the sense of being novel, that
is, the first of its kind in existence (Amdur, Copyright Law
and Practice, 3, p. 69; Gerlach-Barklow Co. v. Morris &:
Bendien, 23 F.2d 159). It has also been said that a composition, or work, to be a subject of copyright protection, must
be useful, and its production must have involved independent
effort and some judgment, selection, or experience on the
part of the author; that many works which are original in
the sense of the law would be disdained by the critic, because
the latter's standard of originality is based upon a different
theory and serves a different purpose ; that to entitle a person
to a copyright it is not necessary that he be the sole creator of
the work for which the protection is claimed-that one who
makes material changes, additions, improvements, notes, comments, or a substantially new adaptation or arrangement of
an old piece of music, or an abridgment, translation, dramatization, digest, index or concordance of a work is entitled to a
copyright for his results (Ball, The Law of Copyright and
Literary Property, 111, pp. 237-241). "Although original
plots (dramatic situations) were exhausted centuries ago,
original and novel ideas for handling old plots seem inexhaustible, and as long as sufficient originality in treatment or
handling of the old plot appears the law endeavors to afford
protection" (concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Schauer, Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 35 Cal.2d 653, 668-669
[221 P.2d 73, 23 A.L.R.2d 216]). Where, as here, plaintiff
has combined old elements in a new way, the question of
originality should have been submitted to the jury. I do
not agree that the 1947 amendment to section 980 of the Civil
Code has circumscribed the protection of the law to merely
the form and manner of expression of a literary composition.
Insofar as the issue of similarity is concerned, I am of
the opinion that the test is still that impression received by
the average reasonable man upon a comparative reading of
the two productions and that if reasonable minds could differ
as to whether or not the two were similar, the question is
one of fact and should be submitted to the jury.
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Because it is my belief that the majority opinion interprets
the 1947 amendment to section 980 of the Civil Code so nar~
rowly as to provide no protection whatever to the products
of an author's creative mind and because there is inherent
therein too strict a test for determining the issue of similarity
between the two productions, I would reverse the entire judgment with directions to the trial court to overrule the demurrers and permit the defendants to answer if they be so
advised.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied May 28,
1953. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should
be granted.

[L. A. No. 22094.
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ARTHUR KURLAN, Appellant, v. COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC., (a Corporation) et al., Respondents.
[la, lb] Literary Property-Pleading.-A count of a complaint
which alleges that plaintiff submitted his radio program to
defendants at their special instance and request pursuant to
an express oral agreement that, if they used all or any part
of the program, they would pay him its reasonable value, and
that defendants accepted submission of the program script
and recording, became fully familiar with it, and thereafter,
without plaintiff's authority or license, produced and broadcast
over a coast-to-coast network a weekly series of programs
which substantially copied, used and embodied his radio program and format to his damage, states a cause of action, and
a judgment for defendants entered on an order sustaining
their demurrers without leave to amend will be reversed with
directions to permit defendants to answer.
[2a, 2b] Id.-Pleading.-A count of a complaint which alleges
that plaintiff submitted his radio program idea and sample audition recording to defendants at their request for
the purpose of sale to or use by them on payment to him
of its reasonable value, and that thereafter they, without plaintiff's license or authority, broadcast a weekly series of programs which substantially copied and used his radio program
[1] See Cal.Jur., Literary Property; Am.Jur., Literary Property
and Copyright, § 112.
McK. Dig. Reference: [1-4] Literary Property.

